What is the Ricketts Laboratory?

The Ricketts Laboratory will be a highly secure and safe infectious disease research facility, built and operated by the University of Chicago, funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID), and sited on land owned by the U.S. Department of Energy at Argonne National Laboratory, southwest of Chicago. NIAID is one of the National Institutes of Health. The lab will cost approximately $31 million to build and will be approximately 35,000 square feet, consisting of office space, Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories, vivarium for work with small animals.

The Ricketts Laboratory is one of the original nine Regional Biocontainment Laboratory (RBL) funded under NIAID's biodefense initiative announced in the second half of 2002. In October of 2005, NIAID announced funding for an additional four RBLs, bringing the total number of RBLs in the biodefense network to thirteen. NIAID’s biodefense network includes support for the design and construction of biocontainment laboratories as regional resources for research and development of improved defenses against emerging and re-emerging diseases and naturally occurring pathogens that could be used as weapons. The biodefense network also includes two National Biocontainment Laboratories. National Biocontainment Laboratories will study the most severe pathogens, while Regional Biocontainment Laboratories like the Ricketts Laboratory will only conduct research on pathogens for which treatments are available.

The Ricketts Laboratory will support the Great Lakes Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases Research, a consortium of research institutions in the upper Midwest that is also funded by NIAID.
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What is a Regional Center of Excellence, an RCE?

Regional Centers of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases Research are consortiums of research institutions in federally-designated regions. Their goals are to train researchers; to find better ways to detect, prevent and cure infectious diseases, in the form of diagnostics, vaccines and therapeutics; to collaborate with diverse approaches and techniques; and to assist in response to local, regional, or national crises involving infectious diseases, whether occurring naturally or caused by terrorists.

The Great Lakes RCE is in the federally designated region V consisting of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. It has 26 member institutions -- those members are: The University of Chicago, Northwestern University, Argonne National Laboratory, Battelle Memorial Institute, Illinois Institute of Technology, Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute, Illinois State University, Loyola University of Chicago, Mayo Clinic, Medical College of Wisconsin, Michigan State University, National Wildlife Health Center, U.S. Department of the Interior, Ohio State University, Purdue University, the University of Cincinnati, the University of Illinois at Chicago, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the University of Michigan, the University of Minnesota Twin Cities, the University of Minnesota at Duluth, the University of Notre Dame, the University of Toledo, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Wayne State University, and Wright State University.
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Why do RCE's need Regional Biocontainment Laboratories?

Research on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases and potential bioterror agents requires specialized laboratory facilities in addition to those available at the campuses of the RCE members. The RBLs and the more highly specialized National Biocontainment Laboratories provide those facilities. In addition, the RBLs will be major resources for academic institutions, biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms that are not members of the RCEs and will train researchers, physicians, and first responders to be prepared in the event of an infectious disease crisis or biodefense emergency.
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Would a Regional Biocontainment Laboratory work on developing or making biological weapons?

No. The research at a RBL will develop new methods of prevention, diagnosis and detection, and treatment of diseases that have been difficult to study because of the scarcity of appropriate facilities. Research on developing biological weapons is illegal under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
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What are NIAID's requirements for building RBLs?

The National Institutes of Health required that institutions proposing regional laboratories:

• Maximize safety.
• Apply the most stringent interpretation of the federal guidelines for design and operation of biocontainment facilities.
• Provide 100% redundancy for mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems to meet the safety needs of the occupants and the community.
• Maximize operational effectiveness.
• Maximize reliability and flexibility for adapting to future needs.
• Maximize interaction and collaboration by scientists.

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What is the difference between a Regional and a National Biocontainment Laboratory?

A Regional Biocontainment Laboratory typically serves a part of the country (one of the ten federally-designated "regions" of the country) and is limited by design, construction and federal certification to handling agents that require "Biosafety Level 3" (BSL-3) safety and security standards. The National Institutes of Health's NIAID is funding thirteen RBLs. A National Biocontainment Laboratory (NBL) serves the entire country and is equipped to handle more dangerous infectious agents requiring "Biosafety Level 4" (BSL-4) facility standards. NBLs are substantially more costly and complex than RBLs. The NIH has committed to funding two NBLs.

BSL-1, BSL-2, BSL-3 and BSL-4 are designations of hazard control requirements that correspond to the characteristics of pathogens, such as the severity of the disease they cause, the route of infection (airborne or not) and the availability of preventive vaccines and effective medical treatments. BSL-1 requires the least hazard control and BSL-4 the most. Many universities and research institutions have BSL-1 and BSL-2 laboratory facilities; BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities are more scarce, more costly, and have more rigorous safety standards. The most stringent interpretation of Biosafety Level guidelines will govern the construction and operation of RBLs and NBLs. Their safety levels will also determine what can be studied at them.

A BSL-3 facility, such as an RBL, conducts research with infectious agents for which there are already some treatments available; a BSL-4 facility, such as an NBL, conducts research on infectious agents for which there is presently no known treatments. (For further information on Biosafety Levels, see FAQ E5.)
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What are "emerging and re-emerging" diseases?

Emerging diseases are those about which very little is presently known because of their relatively recent appearance. As recently as 30 years ago, for example, AIDS was an unknown disease. As recently as 10 years ago, West Nile virus was not found in the United States. Re-emerging diseases are those caused by bacteria and viruses that have become resistant to existing treatments, such as some strains of tuberculosis, influenza, streptococcus and E. coli.
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If treatments for a disease already exist, why do we need to do more research?

Known species of bacteria and viruses evolve and adapt, diseases migrate to new populations and exploit new environments, and new species and varieties of bacteria and viruses regularly appear. Just as there is a new flu vaccine each year, we need to build on our knowledge of other diseases to maintain our defenses.

With these challenges, we need to be able to investigate cures methodically. In the past, finding cures and preventatives has often been serendipitous. Now we have tools to make our search a matter of understanding rather than being hit-or-miss.
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Biological weapons are abhorrent, so why should we build additional facilities where such things can be worked on?

The RBLs will not work on bioweapons, but rather on means of detecting, preventing, or treating diseases caused by them. However, the potential that terrorists and others could bioengineer bacteria and viruses for use as weapons increases the need for additional research to develop defenses against them.
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Specifically, what bio-agents does NIAID ask be studied at a regional laboratory?

The list of organisms that could be studied at a Regional Biocontainment Laboratory is extensive. The federal government has identified a categorized set of fewer than 30 agents of high priority for research with regard to biodefense and emerging disease (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp). Of these, the proposed Ricketts Laboratory would likely focus on only three to six at a time. The organisms studied at Ricketts would be partly dictated by the science proposed and accepted through the Great Lakes RCE. Other work at the Ricketts Laboratory may be executed by qualified researchers and institutions in the region, or by scientists responding to a regional or national biodefense emergency. The diseases presently considered for work in the facility include anthrax, Dengue fever, influenza, plague, botulism, tuberculosis, tularemia, and West Nile virus. Researchers are expected initially to concentrate on anthrax, plague, tularemia and Dengue fever.

Much of the research will use small, non-infectious pieces of pathogens, such as surface proteins or genes that might be useful in developing vaccines or therapeutics.
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What makes a Regional Biocontainment Laboratory different from other BSL-3 laboratories?

There are hundreds of biocontainment facilities around the country of varying sizes and levels that exist for various purposes. (Hospitals, for example, often have specific laboratories designed to contain infectious materials.) These facilities, many in urban areas, have a superb record of safe operations, both for their workers and their neighbors. However, most of these facilities are not qualified to support research as outlined by the National Institutes of Health. A shortage remains of appropriate facilities to meet accelerating concerns about emerging and re-emerging diseases and agents of bioterrorism.

Key elements that make an RBL distinct are its active recruitment of expert researchers around the region, its superior technological resources, its efficiency in operation, and its commitments to training researchers and personnel responsible for public safety, and to promptly responding to national or regional needs. The likelihood of discovery of diagnostic tools, vaccines and antibiotics are greatly improved by the interdisciplinary exchanges planned for in such a facility.
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Where should Regional Biocontainment Laboratories be built? Couldn't they be at a university or a hospital?

There are no requirements regarding the location of Regional or National Biocontainment Laboratories. They may exist in an urban, suburban or rural environment. However, rigorous construction requirements must be met, and some locations may lend themselves more readily to meeting these requirements.

As to being located at universities and hospitals, some are being planned for such institutions, and many universities and hospitals already have areas designed to contain infectious agents that serve the researchers on their particular campuses. Hospitals and public health laboratories, in fact, routinely handle clinical samples without knowing what microorganisms are causing patient symptoms. However, the location at Argonne has significant advantages because, while in close proximity to Chicago and centrally located in Region V, it also can provide well-established, complementary research tools, staff, and security.
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Were other potential locations mentioned in the proposal?

No. The institutions submitting proposals were required to propose a single construction site and describe its relationship to existing infrastructure and support services.
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