Why aren't you planning to build the laboratory closer to the Advanced Photon Source (APS)?

While the APS in the southwestern portion of Argonne National Laboratory is very important to infectious disease research, so are other areas of Argonne National Laboratory, including the Bioscience Division laboratories in the northeastern portion of Argonne where complementary research takes place. All Argonne facilities - including APS and other microbiology user facilities being planned - are convenient to the proposed site.
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Will having such a research facility make Argonne and its neighboring communities a more likely target for terrorists?

One of the problems with terrorists is that it's impossible to predict what they might do. One of their main goals is to make an impact, and we believe the Ricketts Laboratory would have little value for such intent.
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What provisions will be taken to prevent a terrorist attack on the Ricketts Laboratory that would release dangerous germs into the air or water supply?

Terrorist and other malevolent actions/threats are part of ongoing evaluations of all security interests at ANL. Safeguards and Security personnel have been a part of the protection planning process for the Ricketts Laboratory from the earliest stages of development to assure maximum protection. This process is formal and detailed, based on the best classified and unclassified intelligence available. Protection strategies and equipment proposed for the Ricketts Laboratory exceed the established requirements, demonstrating the commitment of the University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory to the safety of employees and surrounding communities. However, the Laboratory does not publicly comment on specific security measures for obvious reasons.

The amounts of infectious agents in the Ricketts laboratory will be very small, only sufficient to conduct the small-scale research necessary to understand more systematically how pathogens cause disease, and to develop improved strategies for timely identification of approaches for prevention, diagnostics, and treatment in response to changing needs.
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What do the Biosafety levels represent?

Biosafety levels have been described in detail in the publication "Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories", published by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and the National Institutes of Health. General descriptions are:

Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) is suitable for work involving well-characterized agents not known to consistently cause disease in healthy adult humans, and of minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the environment. The laboratory is not necessarily separated from the general traffic patterns in the building. Work is generally conducted on open bench tops using standard microbiological practices. Special containment equipment or facility design are neither required nor generally used. Laboratory personnel have specific training in the procedures conducted in the laboratory and are supervised by a scientist with general training in microbiology or a related science.

Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) differs from BSL-1 in that (1) laboratory personnel have specific training in handling pathogenic agents and are directed by competent scientists; (2) access to the laboratory is limited when work is being conducted; (3) extreme precautions are taken with contaminated sharp items; and (4) certain procedures in which infectious aerosols or splashes may be created are conducted in biological safety cabinets or other physical containment equipment.

Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, or production facilities in which work is done with indigenous or exotic agents which may cause serious or potentially lethal disease as a result of exposure by the inhalation route. Laboratory personnel have specific training in handling pathogenic and potentially lethal agents, and are supervised by competent scientists who are experienced in working with these agents. Access to the laboratory is restricted by a combination of methods.

All procedures involving the manipulation of infectious materials are conducted within biological safety cabinets or other physical containment devices, and by personnel wearing appropriate personal protective clothing and equipment. The laboratory has special engineering, design and operational features that rigorously assure that all infectious agents stored or in use remain in the laboratory. All waste generated in the laboratory is sterilized before release. The workers' special laboratory clothing remains in the laboratory until it has been properly cleaned or sterilized.

Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections and life-threatening disease. Agents with a close or identical antigenic relationship to BSL-4 agents are handled at this level until sufficient data are obtained either to confirm continued work at this level or to work with them at a lower level. Members of the laboratory staff have specific and thorough training in handling extremely hazardous infectious agents and they understand the primary and secondary containment functions of the standard and special practices, the containment equipment, and the laboratory design characteristics. They are supervised by competent scientists who are trained and experienced in working with these agents. Access to the laboratory is strictly controlled by the laboratory director. The facility is either in a separate building or in a controlled area within a building, which is completely isolated from all other areas of the building. A specific facility operations manual is prepared or adopted.

Within work areas of the facility, all activities are confined to Class III biological safety cabinets or Class II biological safety cabinets used with one-piece positive pressure personnel suits ventilated by a life support system. The BSL-4 laboratory has special engineering and design features to prevent microorganisms from being disseminated into the environment.

For a complete list of requirements, see http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4s3.htm
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You indicated that, as a BSL-3 facility, the Ricketts Laboratory will handle only pathogens for which there are cures or vaccines, but isn't it likely that your manipulation of the known germs may result in mutations for which there is no known treatment?

It is highly unlikely that research performed in the Ricketts Laboratory would result in modified bacteria or viruses with increased virulence. In fact, the proposed research programs aim to identify genes and mechanisms involved in pathogenesis by scoring exclusively for reduced virulence of bacteria and viruses. Furthermore, all bacteria and viruses that enter the laboratory, regardless of their potential for causing disease, will be sterilized (killed) before disposal.
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Can you assure the community that the Ricketts Laboratory or any program developed therein will not evolve into a BSL-4 initiative?

The lease for the federal land prohibits performing research that requires BSL-4 containment, and even were a change contemplated, it could not be evolutionary. The physical, regulatory and economic obstacles to changing a BSL-3 so it would meet BSL-4 criteria are virtually insurmountable. In recognition of the substantially different design requirements for construction and operation between BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities, NIAID requested proposals for either one or the other, and allocated substantially different levels of funding for the two types of facilities.

Thus, should any change be contemplated, it would require either highly disruptive major renovation or construction of a new facility. This would require new community acceptance, a separate, independent environmental analysis, and a revision of the DOE-approved release.
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Has there ever been an accident involving the public at a BSL-3 or BSL-4 facility?

No. A number of BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities have operated safely in the United States for 30 years. Rare accidents, such as needlesticks, may cause exposure of laboratory staff; immediate treatment of any person so exposed avoids any danger to other workers or to the community.
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Who will conduct the impact study to determine the likely consequences of any release into the atmosphere of the pathogens handled at the Ricketts Center?

In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and its National Institute of Health, as the federal funding agency for construction, will be the lead agency responsible for necessary environmental evaluations. The Department of Energy (DOE) will cooperate in conducting the evaluations and/or evaluating the results because the facility is to be constructed on land leased from DOE. Professionals from Argonne, who have demonstrated expertise in evaluating potential environmental impacts, including the likelihood and consequences of any significant release, will conduct the evaluations.

All aspects of planning for the Ricketts Laboratory are taken with the greatest seriousness, and experience with many other BSL-3 level laboratories leads us to believe that a release most likely will not occur.
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What is the number of fatalities and the number of serious injuries on community residents that are considered tolerable in the cost-to-benefit analysis of this project?

No injury or fatality involving the public or employees is acceptable. The federal objective is that the design and operation of the facility, either as proposed or as appropriately modified in accordance with the results of an environmental assessment, can be validly determined to have no significant environmental impact under a variety of normal and adverse conditions.
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What independent entity will be responsible for monitoring compliance with all security measures by the Ricketts Laboratory?

Operation of the Ricketts Laboratory may begin only after the federal Center for Disease Control (CDC) completes an on-site audit that concludes that the facility complies with all requirements for physical design and security, and for operating plans such as access control, emergency preparedness and response, and personnel training. The CDC will periodically re-certify the facility; and is authorized to conduct unannounced inspections at any time. As owner of the land, DOE will also monitor compliance. Failure to comply with the regulations can result in substantial civil and criminal penalties.
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What funding or insurance will be secured to care for personal and property losses in case of a release of pathogens or to compensate residents for any devaluation of property values due to proximity to the RBL?

The proposed facility is expected to blend seamlessly with Argonne's operations and not create negative effects on property values. The assessment of potential environmental effects of the proposed facility will address this issue in greater detail. On the other hand, creation of high-paying professional jobs has a potential positive effect on property values.

Meanwhile, the University maintains insurance programs comparable to those of similar institutions to address any liabilities that might arise from this activity.

The analysis continues a process that began in conjunction with the initial design proposals and, since the RBL has been designed to meet or exceed safety and environmental standards for a facility of this sort, it is expected that its construction and operation will have little or no impact on Argonne and its neighbors.
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Have other locations - farther away from populated areas - been considered for this initiative? If so, what locations?

The University of Chicago considered a number of locations for the proposed construction of a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory. The Argonne site was chosen because of its proximity to many technical resources unavailable at the campus or anywhere else in the country, its access control/security infrastructure, its emergency preparedness and response resources, and the lack of negative impact on the surrounding communities.
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Will the proposed laboratory be related to the National Nuclear Security Administration?

No. The purpose of the Ricketts Laboratory would be to support the work of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), and any public or private entity, so long as their research is compatible with the broad goals established by NIAID. Construction will be funded by the NIH and the University of Chicago with its colleagues.
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What kind of tick carries Rocky Mountain spotted fever?

Rocky Mountain spotted fever is primarily transmitted by the American dog tick (Dermacentor variabilis) and Rocky Mountain wood tick (Dermacentor andersoni). The brown dog tick Rhipicephalus sanguineus and the tick Amblyomma cajennense have also been found to carry Rocky Mountain spotted fever.
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